Table of Contents

Preface; Notes on contributors; 1. Institutions and their design Robert E. Goodin; 2. Institutional design and rational choice Philip Pettit; 3. Second best theories and institutional design: a note on statics and dynamics Bruce Talbot Coram; 4. The informal logic of institutional design John S. Dryzek; 5. Institutional morality Russell Hardin; 6. The publicity principle David Luban; 7. Designing institutions in East European transitions Claus Offe; 8. Political deals institutional settings Kenneth A. Shepsle; 9. Self-inventing institutions: institutional design and the UK welfare state Rudolf Klein; 10. Selection and the currency of reward Geoffrey Brennan.

Promotional Information

This volume illustrates and synthesizes new theories of institutional design recently developed by scholars across a range of disciplines.

Reviews

'The Theory of Institutional Design is required reading for the many people, in many fields, who are interested in the effects of institutions on social life. It is an exceptionally good introduction to the field, and because the interdisciplinary essays are state-of-the-art, it is an important and original contribution as well.' Cass Sunstein, University of Chicago 'Institutional analysis is central to the contemporary social sciences, but is still not adequately understood. Robert Goodin has advanced that understanding with this book on institutional design. The book integrates the approaches of several social science disciplines and relates those approaches to fundamental theoretical and normative questions. Professor Goodin raises a number of questions about the possibilities of the purposive design of institutions, and the process of institutionalization. This is a major contribution to the literature that should be read by all students of social and political theory.' B. Guy Peters, University of Pittsburgh