This book is the Winner of the Samuel Eliot Morison Prize, sponsored by the Society for Military History.
Geoffrey Parker is Andreas Dorpalen Professor of History at The Ohio State University.
"A deeply-researched, sublime and immensely satisfying analysis of the policies of one of the most important figures in western and world history during the past one thousand years." Paul Kennedy "This is a history that moves backward from the strategic concerns of today; that gives it an edge and an immediacy few other books on Philip have achieved...A highly detailed but also immensely readable book." Anthony Pagden, New York Times Book Review "A splendid study...Parker offers an enthralling analysis." Henry Kamen, Times Literary Supplement "A superb study that is part biography, part military history, and part strategic treatise...No less remarkable than Parker's mastery of voluminous Spanish archives is his use of Philip's rule to illuminate the broader problems of grand strategy, including such supposedly modern phenomena as information overload." Foreign Affairs "The Grand Strategy of Philip II is history on a grand scale. In it, Parker has distilled the fruit of thirty years' research and writing, which have made him the leading authority on Spain's relations with northern Europe in the early modern era...A highly sophisticated and stimulating work." Bruce Taylor, History: Review of New Books
Between 1556 and 1598, King Philip II of Spain was the ruler of the world's first global empire, controlling much of Europe and America. In this volume, Parker, a prolific author and noted historian of Europe and particularly Spain, examines the strategy behind the policy and the decisions leading to Philip's accumulation of power. Beyond a general examination of strategy, the author studies three aspects of Philip's reign: his efforts to maintain authority in the Netherlands, his management of foreign relations with Scotland and England, and his attempt to conquer England between 1585 and 1588. Parker concludes that Philip's failures resulted not from a lack of strategy but from small factors, including his own idiosyncrasies, that played a disproportionate part in frustrating his plans. This superb volume adds much to our understanding of European history and will be of interest to most academic libraries with collections in that area.ÄMark L. Grover, Brigham Young Univ. Lib., Provo, UT
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