"Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror is a must read for academics, military professionals, and national security practitioners. The author combines his unique perspective as a military professional with his academic credentials to create a cogent work that explains how embedded military cultural preferences can influence or impede the preparation for and conduct of counterinsurgency. In a contemporary security environment that sees the U.S. military prosecuting multiple counterinsurgencies, and where the future may hold more of the same, this well written book is very relevant. Overall, the book is balanced, insightful, and well researched. For military professionals and security experts involved in employing our armed forces in this era, this is a book to read." -- Professor Richard H. Shultz, Director, International Security Studies Program, Professor of International Politics, The Fletcher School, Tufts University "Colonel Robert Cassidy is at the cutting edge of a new generation of US military officers who boldly contemplate global security issues, undaunted by the caveats of Summers and Weinburger and unencumbered by the baggage of Vietnam. In Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror, Cassidy bravely repudiates the military obsession for technology and firepower and instead methodically explores Russian, British and US military cultures for more complex lessons of success. His conclusions lead to a long term, multi-department, multi-disciplined strategy that is wiser, less industrial in scale and without the televisual qualities of a knock-down victory that is associated with US defense policy thinking. A must-read for military staff searching for an alternative dimension of experience from which to understand today's security discourse." -- John Mackinlay, War Studies Department, Kings College London "Recommended professional reading. LTC Cassidy's analysis, drawing on relevant historical examples over the last century, illustrates the profound impact of military culture on counterinsurgency operations. A valuable read for any officer, the lessons learned in this book apply to today's operations in Iraq as well as to preparing our military for future conflicts." -- Wayne A. Downing, General, USA (Retired), Chair, Combating Terrorism Center
Robert M. Cassidy has served in leadership and staff positions in the 4th Infantry Division, the 8th Infantry Division, the 82nd Airborne Division, the Third Army, and the Seventh Army. He is a graduate of the French Joint Defense College and he has a PhD in International Security Studies from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He is the author of Peacekeeping in the Abyss: British and American Peacekeeping Doctrine and Practice After the Cold War (Praeger, 2004) and he has published articles in Parameters, Military Review, Small Wars and Insugencies and The Fletcher Forum.
Counterinsurgency is a timely submission that addresses the effects
of globalization and modernity upon the conduct of insurgency and
counter-insurgency. . . . [T]he reader can use this work as a point
of departure to continue the discussion among his or her
professional compatriots rather than as a definitive guidebook. . .
. [T]his work should be in the library of any serious student of
counter-insurgency or of military culture and its effect on the
conduct of operations.
*Royal United Services Institute Journal*
In a very timely, interesting, and thought-provoking book, Robert
Cassidy argues for re-conceptualizing what was first called the
global war on terrorism: then the global struggle against violent
extremism, and currently, the long war. He argues that the
prolonged struggle against al Qaeda and its affiliates should be
seen as a global counterinsurgency, which requires an appropriate
strategy, integrating national and international resources and
agencies. Conceptualizing the long war as a global
counterinsurgency requires also rethinking military culture,
doctrine, and interagency coordination, and Cassidy's book does
just that. . . . [a] useful and important addition to the
scholarship on counterinsurgency.
*Political Science Quarterly*
Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror takes the Army to
task for forsaking the lessons of its own history. . . . [A]n
impressive exploration of why we were years into the war in Iraq
before we published a field manual on counterinsurgency and are
only now attempting to find a coherent approach to a complex world
war. His idea of turning insurgents against themselves offers an
insightful solution to what appears to be an intractable problem. .
. . Cassidy and his fellow military intellectuals need to conduct
their debate from the inside, in public, so that the mistakes and
successes of the past receive the kind of thoughtful examination
they are due.
*ARMY*
This story has been told before, but Cassidy's account is richer
than most and benefits from the evident exasperation of a U.S.
Special Forces officer trying to cope with a conflict for which his
country seems so unready. To demonstrate that Western countries
need not be paralyzed by their military cultures, he finds evidence
in past practice, including the Indian wars and the Philippines,
that it is possible to deal with insurgents in a politically astute
manner. The requirements are minimal but include credible force,
close cooperation between civil and military agencies, indigenous
forces employed where possible, and legitimate political processes,
even when this means drawing in opposition elements.
*Foreign Affairs*
Cassidy views the global war on terror conducted by the United
States since 2001 as a new kind of insurgency and counterinsurgency
that has evolved within the context of globalization. His analysis
of this new global networked insurgency and counterinsurgency
operates on the principles of know thy enemy, know yourself, and
know the kind of war you are embarking on, thus presenting chapters
analyzing the culture, ideology, and tactics of al-Qaeda and
affiliated groups; the capacity or propensity of the Russian,
American, and British military cultures for counterinsurgency; and
historical lessons from American, British, and French experiences
with counterinsurgency.
*Reference & Research Book News*
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